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NFIB V. SEBELIUS:
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
David Orentlicher*.
Abstract
With its opinion on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), the U.S. Supreme Court sparked much discussion regarding the
implications of the case for other federal statutes. In particular, scholars
have debated the significance of the Court's recognition of an
anticoercion limit to the Spending Clause power.
When it recognized an anticoercion limit for the ACA's Medicaid
expansion, the Court left considerable uncertainty as to the parameters
of that limit. This essay sketches out one valuable and very plausible
interpretation of the Court's new anticoercion principle. It also indicates
how this new principle can address a long-standing problem with
congressional exercise of the Commerce Clause power-the
federalization of local crime.
Specifically, I argue first .that we can best understand the Court's
anticoercion principle not by parsing the text of its spending power
analysis in isolation, but by identifyihg a common strand ofprinciple that
the spending power analysis shares with the Court.'s analysis of the
individual mandate to purchase health care under the federal taxing
power. Both analyses suggest a common principle of proportionality for
the exercise offederal powers.
If that is true for a Medicaid expansion enacted under the spending
power and an individual mandate enacted under the taxing power, it also
may-and should-be true for a criminal prohibition enacted under the
commerce power, the primary source of authority for federal criminal
statutes. If so, then the Court could find that Congress exceeds its
authority when it imposes more severe sentences than do states for
misconduct that is essentially local in nature.
INTRODUCTION
With its opinion on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
the U.S. Supreme Court sparked much discussion regarding the implications of the
* 0 2013 David Orentlicher. Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law, Indiana University
Robert H. McKinney School of Law. JD, Harvard Law School; MD, Harvard Medical
School. I am grateful for very helpful comments from Shawn Boyne and Joshua Dressler
and excellent editing by the Utah Law Review executive board and staff.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 1.19
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.), amended by
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case for other federal statutes. In particular, scholars have debated the significance
of the Court's recognition of an anticoercion limit for the Spending Clause.2 While
the Court suggested in past cases that an exercise of the spending power could
excessively pressure states to do the federal government's bidding,3 the Court
never actually found a federal offer of funds to be unconstitutionally coercive. That
changed with the Court's holding in National Federation of Independent Business
v. ,SebeliuS4 (NFIB), which addressed the validity of the ACA's Medicaid
expansion .5
But while the Court recognized an anticoercion limit to the Spending Clause,
it left considerable uncertainty as to the parameters of that limit. The majority
identified multiple features of the Medicaid expansion that were troubling, and it
may be that all of the features must be present to make other exercises of the
spending power unconstitutional. Or it may be that only some of the features must
be present.
In this Essay, I discuss the Court's anticoercion limit by looking beyond the
specifics of NFIB's analysis of the Medicaid expansion. In doing so, I consider the
significance of an important principle that seemed to animate the Court's
thinking-a principle of proportionality. The Court worried about the federal
government's ability to exploit its broad powers in ways disproportionate to the
problems it is trying to address. 6 NFIB signals a stricter application by the Court of
the proportionality principle to federal action.
More specifically, I argue first that we can best understand NFIB's
anticoercion limit not by parsing the text of its spending power analysis in
isolation, but by identifying a common strand of principle that the spending power
analysis shares with NFIB's analysis of the individual mandate to purchase health
care under the federal taxing power. Both analyses rely on a principle of
proportionality for the exercise of federal powers. That is, Congress acts within its
authority when its penalties are commensurate with the degree of noncompliance
with federal law. However, Congress overreaches when it comes down too hard on
those who do not obey its commands.
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (codified in scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
2 See Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and
Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REv. 1,
46-71 (2013).
3 See infra p. 467.
4 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
See id. at .2604. The Court held that while Congress could proceed with its
expansion of the Medicaid program, it could not condition all of a state's Medicaid funding
on the state's willingness to participate in the Medicaid expansion. See id. at 2607. Rather
than losing all of its Medicaid funds by not participating in the expansion, a state will lose
only the funds that are tied to the expansion. The features of the Medicaid expansion are
described, infra, at p. 465.
6 See infra pp. 468-71.
464 [No. 2
2013] PROPORTIONALITY IN THE EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
I then consider how greater attention to proportionality can be extended
beyond the spending and taxing powers to address a long-standing problem with
exercises of the Commerce Clause power-the federalization of local crime.
Commentators have argued that the federal government has usurped the
prerogatives of states by converting local crimes into federal crimes and by
imposing more severe sentences under federal law than a defendant would receive
under state law.7 A meaningful principle of proportionality can address the
problem of more severe sentences under federal law. By applying proportionality
concerns, the Court could find that Congress exceeds its authority when it imposes
more severe sentences than do states for misconduct that is essentially local in
nature.
A broad principle of proportionality would serve two valuable roles. First, it
would tie legal rules to a fundamental principle of law. Second, it would bring
greater consistency to different parts of constitutional doctrine.
In the next section, I discuss NFIB's analysis of the Medicaid expansion under
the federal spending power. I then explain how a principle of proportionality can
be derived by reading the Court's analysis of the spending power in conjunction
with its consideration of the individual mandate to purchase health care coverage
under the federal taxing power. Finally, I show how extending a principle of
proportionality to the federal commerce power can address the federalization of
local crime.
NFIB AND THE UNDULY COERCIVE MEDICAID EXPANSION
In its analysis of the ACA's Medicaid expansion, the NFIB Court reminded us
that Congress may not "commandeer" state legislatures and force them to do the
federal government's bidding.8 As the Court held in New York v. United States,9
Congress can encourage states to enact particular policies, but it always must give
states the option not to do so.' 0 Otherwise, state autonomy would be gutted."
Thus, for example, Congress may offer states the opportunity to implement a new
program for their residents according to federal standards or let the federal
government assume responsibility for implementation.' 2 The ACA includes that
kind of option with the health insurance exchanges. 3 Each state can operate its
own exchange, or the federal government will operate one for the state.14
7 See infra p. 471.
8 Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2660 (quoting New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992)).
9 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
10 See id. at 161.
" See id. at 161-63.
12 Id. at 167-68.
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
14 Health insurance exchanges will serve as a marketplace at which health insurers can
offer their plans, and individuals or employers can purchase plans. These health insurance
exchanges will operate as the health insurance policy analogue to travel marketplaces like
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Congress also may encourage states to do its bidding by exercising its
spending power.'5 If federal legislators want states to raise their drinking age from
eighteen to twenty-one, for example, Congress can send more highway
construction funds to the states that adopt the higher drinking age.' 6 States can
choose whether to enact the desired federal policy and receive additional funds, or
they can reject the federal policy and receive less funding. The Medicaid
expansion followed the spending power model for encouraging cooperation by
states. As with Medicaid generally, states may choose whether or not to participate
in the expansion, and Congress encourages state participation by giving states
federal dollars for every dollar that the states spend. '7
The ACA's Medicaid expansion operates by extending eligibility to all
persons who earn up to 138% of the federal poverty level of income.' 8 In the past,
Medicaid eligibility extended only to persons who were poor and also fell into one
of several categories.9 This "categorical eligibility" included children, pregnant
women, single parents caring for children, and persons with disabilities, but it did
not include able-bodied adults without children or adults in two-parent families.2 0
The Medicaid expansion has two important effects. First, all indigent persons
qualify for Medicaid. 2 1 Categorical eligibility is no longer the coin of the realm. 22
Second, the income threshold for losing Medicaid eligibility is uniform across
23
states. Currently, adults can lose their Medicaid eligibility at incomes below 50%
of the federal poverty level in some states, while retaining it up to 200% of the
federal poverty level in other states.24
As mentioned, Congress maintained the spending power model for
encouraging state cooperation with the ACA's Medicaid expansion. States are free
to choose whether to participate, and the program provides a strong financial
incentive for participation. Currently, the federal government matches every dollar
a state spends on Medicaid benefits with at least another dollar.2 5 Put differently,
Expedia or Travelocity, where airlines, hotels, and car rental companies offer their services
to customers.
' See New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
16 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
' See infra p. 467.
18 Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 25.
19 David Orentlicher, Rights to Healthcare in the United States: Inherently Unstable,
38 AM. J. L. & MED. 326, 331 (2012).
20 Id. Many states expanded their Medicaid programs beyond the basic categories of
eligibility. Id at 331-32.
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I)-(VIII) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
22 However, the ACA maintains different tracks to eligibility. Some people still will
qualify because they are children or single adults caring for children, while other people
will qualify under the Act's expansion provisions. See id.
See id. at § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
24 Adult Income Eligibility Limits at Application as a Percent of the Federal Poverty
Level (FPL), January 2013, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://www.statehealthfa
cts.org/comparereport.jsp?rep=130&cat-4 (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(3)(F)(i) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
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the federal government covers at least 50% of the cost of Medicaid benefits. For
some states, the federal government covers over 70% of the cost (i.e., a nearly
three to one match).26 The Medicaid expansion provides an even stronger incentive
for state participation; in the first few years, the federal government will pick up
the full cost for newly eligible beneficiaries, before gradually reducing its share to
90%.27 In other words, the Medicaid match will be no less than nine to one for the
expansion population in all states.
So far, so good. But here's the rub. In some of its previous spending power
decisions, the Court warned Congress that there were limits on the extent to which
28the federal government can try to encourage states to do its bidding. At some
point, a financial incentive to follow federal policy can turn from a reasonable
offer into compulsion.2 9 At some point, the states really have no choice but to
adopt the federal policy. Congress had never reached that point before, but it did
with the Medicaid expansion. 30
The constitutional problem for the expansion lay in the fact that while states
could decline to participate, the ACA threatened them with the loss of all of their
Medicaid dollars.3' That is, states not only would forgo the nine to one match for
the expansion, but they also might forfeit all of the federal funding that they have
been receiving from the federal government under pre-ACA Medicaid. According
to the Court, this was too high a price to pay for nonparticipation.32 Congress can
use the nine to one match as an incentive, but it cannot place funds from the other
parts of the Medicaid program at risk. If Congress could withhold all of a state's
Medicaid dollars, it could withdraw funds that amount to more than 10% of the
typical state's total budget.33 That would be like putting "a gun to the head" of the
states.34 The states would not really be free to choose whether to participate in the
Medicaid expansion. If Congress could exercise that much clout to make states do
the federal government's bidding, the two-government system that the Constitution
created would collapse. Power would be vested "in one central government, and
individual liberty would suffer."35
26 See, e.g., Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures, 76 Fed.
Reg. 74061, 74062-63 (Nov. 30, 2011); Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 18.
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).
28 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
29 Id.
30 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2634 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("Prior to
today's decision . . . the Court has never ruled that the terms of any grant crossed the
indistinct line between temptation and coercion.").
3 See id. at 2604.
32 See id. at 2604-05.
33 See id. at 2605; see also VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMMISSION ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MOVING AHEAD AMID FISCAL CHALLENGES: A LOOK AT
MEDICAID SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY TRENDS 11 (2011), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8248.pdf.
34 Nat'1 Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
3 Id. at 2602.
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If the Medicaid expansion represented undue coercion, what other exercises
of the spending power also might be unconstitutional? What principle did the
Court establish to guide Congress in its future spending power legislation? In the
next section, I will discuss the principle of proportionality that seemed to animate
the Court's analysis.
UNDUE COERCION AND A PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
One might read the NFIB opinion narrowly and discern only an "anti-
leveraging" principle in the decision.36 According to the Court, what made the
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional was the effort by Congress to coerce states
into adopting a new federal program by making the price of nonparticipation the
loss of substantial funds from another federal program that the states had
previously adopted.37 If Congress had included the Medicaid expansion when it
passed Medicaid originally, it would have been valid. But Congress may not
leverage a state's prior major commitment to a federal program to compel a state's
participation in another federal program. 38 Thus, as discussed, Congress could not
withdraw all -of a state's existing Medicaid funding if the state failed to participate
in the Medicaid expansion. It only could deny states the matching dollars for the
Medicaid expansion if the states declined to participate.
Other readings of NFIB also are quite plausible. Rather than adhering strictly
to the antileveraging factors identified by the Court, one also could identify a
broader principle based in contract law to explain the Court's spending power
analysis.39 Indeed, the majority observed that the Court had "repeatedly
characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as 'much in the nature of a
contract."'4 0 Hence, the NFIB Court was concerned about the extent to which the
Medicaid expansion did not treat the states fairly as partners in contract. For
example, the Court viewed the expansion as a unilateral and dramatic modification
of the Medicaid program. 4 1 Under a contract law approach, it makes sense to say
that Congress has less leeway when it modifies the terms of its contractual
36 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after
NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 864-65 (2013).
31 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603-06.
38 See Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 870-71.
39 See James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act's Mandated
Medicaid Expansion: The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, 2011-2012 CATO
SUP. CT. REv. 67, 71.
40 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S.
181, 186 (2002)).
41 See id. at 2602-06. To be sure, critics have observed that the Court unfairly
characterized the Medicaid expansion as a new program that dramatically changed the
nature of Medicaid. See id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 25.
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relationships with the states rather than when it sets terms of the contract at the
time the contractual relationship is formed.42
While the antileveraging and contract law interpretations make a good deal of
sense, it makes more sense to identify an interpretation that takes account not only
of the spending power part of the opinion, but also the taxing power part of the
opinion (which addressed the constitutionality of the individual mandate to
purchase health care coverage). When two powers lie in the same clause of Article
I, Section 8, they likely reflect a common guiding principle.44 Indeed, in its
Spending Clause analysis of the Medicaid expansion, the NFIB Court relied on a
previous taxing power decision.45
A common principle was at work in both the spending power analysis of the
Medicaid expansion and the taxing power analysis of the individual mandate-a
principle of proportionality. If Congress wants to encourage individuals or states to
do its bidding under the taxing or spending power, it has to employ penalties that
are commensurate with the degree of noncompliance with federal law. A closer
look at the Court's discussion of the individual mandate will illustrate this point.
Under the ACA, most Americans will have to carry a health insurance policy.
There are exceptions for persons with low income, undocumented immigrants,
members of certain religious groups, and others. Most people will satisfy the
insurance mandate through employer-sponsored coverage, Medicare; or Medicaid.
But some people will have to purchase their own private health care policy. 4 6 After
rejecting the Commerce Clause as authority for the mandate, the Court upheld the
mandate as a valid exercise of the taxing power 47 -failure to carry health care
coverage will subject individuals to a tax that amounts to 2.5% of their household
income.48
In relying on the taxing power, the Court had to overcome an important
objection. Challengers to the mandate characterized the levy for noncompliance as
42 While principles of contract modification reflect the antileveraging concerns that
worried the NFIB Court, see Blumstein, supra note 39, at 74-77, a contract law approach
would have broader implications than an antileveraging approach.
43 As is the case for the taxing and spending powers. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
44 Cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison) (observing that construction of a
constitution should give meaning to each part of an expression such that they "conspire to
some common end").
45 See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602-03 (citing Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586, 587, 589, 590, 591 (1937)). Steward Machine involved the
question whether Congress unduly pressured states to enact specific unemployment
compensation laws by abating a tax on businesses if they paid into a federally approved
state compensation plan. Id. at 2603. However, the NFIB court observed that there was no
undue coercion in Steward Machine. Id.
46 Id. at 2580.
47 See id. at 2593-2600.
48 Id. at 2580. There also are minimum and maximum levels for the tax. Id.
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a penalty rather than a tax, and the statute itself talked in terms of a penalty.4 9
While the Court cited a few differences between penalties and taxes,50 a key factor
was the size of the levy.5' The Court distinguished the liability for noncompliance
with the ACA mandate from the liability for noncompliance with a child labor law
that Congress adopted in 1919.52 Congress had characterized the levy under the
child labor law as a tax, but the Court found it to be an unconstitutional penalty in
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 53 in part because companies would have to pay 10% of
their net income for employing child labor, "no matter how small their
infraction."5 4 As the Drexel Furniture Court pointed out, a company could forfeit
the full 10% even if it employed a single child for a single day. 5 Such an
"exceedingly heavy burden," wrote Chief Justice John Roberts in NFIB, is in the
nature of a penalty rather than a tax. In contrast, the ACA will impose a much
smaller burden on those who fail to purchase health care coverage. People earning
$35,000 a year, for example, will pay only $60 in any month during which they do
not carry health care insurance. In short, Congress can impose the individual
mandate through its taxing power because the magnitude of the tax is not
disproportionately high.
Note the contrast with the Court's spending power analysis. As discussed
earlier, when the Court limited the conditions that Congress could impose on the
Medicaid expansion, the Justices cited the substantial burden that states would
have borne under the ACA's terms if they declined to participate in the
expansion. For the individual mandate, on the other hand, the Court emphasized
the mild burden on individuals who decline to buy health care coverage. 5 9 In
judging the validity of the two provisions, the Court was very concerned that the
ACA's sanctions not be disproportionately high. Congress overreaches when it
imposes penalties for noncompliance that are unduly harsh. Minor degrees of
misconduct should not trigger the same level of punishment as major kinds of
misconduct.
A requirement of proportionality has much value: it provides a principle for
containing federal authority and, - therefore, for ensuring that the national
government fulfills the framers' intent of a government of limited power.
49 See id. at 2594. If the levy constituted a penalty, the mandate would have failed
because the Court had found that it was not authorized under the Commerce Clause power.
See id. at 2593.
'o See id. at 2595.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 2595-96.
5 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 20 (1922).
54 Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595.
5s Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 34.
5 6 Nat'lFed'n oflndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595.
17 Id. at 2596 n.8.
5 See supra pp. 467-68.
59 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
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While the Court may be giving considerations of proportionality new
emphasis, the principle has a long pedigree. As the NFIB opinion observed, the
Court's requirement of proportionality for the taxing power dates back to the 1922
Drexel Furniture case.
While proportionality considerations -played a key role in NFIB, the Court
also cited other factors. In concluding that the individual mandate was a valid
exercise of the taxing power, for example, the Court observed that the mandate
will be enforced by the IRS rather than another government agency and that there
is no scienter requirement typical of punitive statutes.60 Similarly, in concluding
that the Medicaid expansion was unduly coercive, the Court invoked not only
concerns about the magnitude of the funds that states would lose for not
participating in the expansion; it also cited the fact that the expansion represented a
major modification of the Medicaid program and that Congress tried to leverage
the states' prior commitments to Medicaid to induce them to sign up for the
expansion.61 Still, even if proportionality considerations do not tell the whole
story, they played a major role in the Court's thinking. With a more modest
penalty, the Medicaid expansion would have survived fully, and with a more
severe penalty, the individual mandate would not have survived.
In the wake of NFIB, the Court left itself with many questions about the
implications of its decision. For example, how coercive must a financial incentive
be to run afoul of the spending power limitations? As the Court observed, federal
funding for Medicaid represents an unusually large chunk of a state's overall
spending. 62 Will the funding that might be forfeited for failing to participate in any
other federal programs be deemed so substantial that it leaves states without any
real choice? 63
In addition to applying the NFIB decision to other exercises of the spending or
taxing powers, the Court also could extend its logic to exercises of the commerce
power. In the remainder of this Essay, I discuss how the Court's concerns about
proportionality could apply to a criminal prohibition enacted under the commerce
power, the primary source of authority for federal criminal statutes. By extending
the principle of proportionality to federal criminal prohibitions, the Court could
provide an answer to the problem of the federalization of local crime.
THE FEDERALIZATION OF LOCAL CRIME AND NFIB
For quite some time, judges, prosecutors, scholars, and practitioners have
worried about the extent to which Congress has federalized local crime. Many
60 See id. at 2596. The Court also identified an additional factor that reflected
proportionality concerns: there were no legal consequences for people who choose to pay
the penalty rather than purchase health care insurance. People who pay the levy rather than
purchase insurance would "have fully complied with the law." Id. at 2597.
61 See id. at 2603-06.
62 See id. at 2605; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 33, at 11.




articles have discussed the concern, 6 including an American Bar Association
report on the problem. 65
Congress has federalized local law enforcement in two important ways. First,
it has converted many local crimes into federal crimes. As experts have observed,
Congress often turns garden-variety offenses like theft and assault into violations
of federal law.66 Simple carjacking or arson also can trigger federal prosecutions.67
Second, Congress typically imposes harsher sentences than would be imposed
under corresponding state laws. Instead of receiving probation or diversion into a
treatment program, defendants may spend several years in prison.6 8 Congress has
been able to substitute its view about the appropriate length of sentences across a
wide range of crimes. 69
As a result of the federal intrusion, state governments have lost control over
decisions whether to prosecute certain kinds of wrongdoing and over decisions
regarding the severity'with which wrongdoing should be punished. To a substantial
extent, the federal government has assumed the kind of broad police power that the
constitutional framers reserved for the states.70
6 See generally Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From
Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747 (2005)
[hereinafter Many Faces]; Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to
Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995)
[hereinafter New Principles]; Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce Clause and Federalized
Crime: A Tale of Two Thieves, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC!. 27 (1996).
65 See TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 13 (1998).
66 See id. at 30-31.
67 See Brickey, supra note 64, at 30-3 1.
68 See Beale, Many Faces, supra note 64, at 761-62; Beale, New Principles, supra
note 64, at 998-99. Federal sentences generally are higher than state sentences, particularly
for drug or weapon offenses. See TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 65, at 30-31.
69 The federalization of crime not only raises serious concerns about the balance of
federal and state power. It also raises serious concerns about equity among different
defendants. Two associates in crime may receive vastly different sentences when one is
prosecuted by state law enforcement officials and the other by federal officials. See Steven
D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643,
648-49 (1997) (discussing United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1993), in which
one defendant was assessed court costs and fees of $176 by a state court while his partner
in a marijuana-growing operation was sentenced to ten years in prison by a federal court).
7o See Beale, Many Faces, supra note 64, at 754-55. To be sure, writers often
exaggerate the problem. For example, it is common to read that Congress has enacted some
4,500 criminal statutes and perhaps half of them since the 1970s. But many of those
statutes rarely lead to prosecutions. In fact, 95% of felony convictions occur in state courts,
and federal prosecutions are concentrated on matters of national concern. See Susan R.
Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62
EMORY L.J. 1, 3, 6-7, 18 (2012). Still, for those defendants who receive a multiyear prison
sentence rather than avoiding incarceration altogether, it is no comfort that federal
prosecutors generally leave prosecution of local crime to the states.
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NFIB provides a partial, but important, response to the federalization of local
crime. Defendants still will have to rely on United States v. Lopez7' and United
States v. Morrison72 if they want to argue that Congress lacks authority to make
certain conduct a federal crime. 73 While NFIB held that Congress may not use the
Commerce Clause to regulate inactivity,7 4 that limit will not help defendants
charged with engaging in criminal activity. Nevertheless, defendants may be able
to invoke NFIB to challenge the severity of their sentences. The Court's principle
of proportionality can readily be applied to judgments concerning the appropriate
length of a felon's sentence.75
EXTENDING THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY TO FEDERAL CRIME STATUTES
Principles of proportionality are fundamental to criminal prohibitions. We
believe it unfair when a convict receives a punishment that is too harsh or too
lenient when considering the nature of the crime, 77 and we believe it unfair when
The primary concern is that federal penalties are being imposed for local crimes that
states are addressing with their own law enforcement systems. Congress rightly intervenes
when criminal activity is national in scope. Federal prosecution also may be needed when
states fail to enforce their laws against discrimination or other serious misconduct. But as
an American Bar Association task force observed, Congress often defines new federal
crimes "in patchwork response to newsworthy events, rather than as part of a cohesive code
developed in response to an identifiable federal need." TASK FORCE ON THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 65, at 14-15.
7' 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
72 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
73 In Lopez and Morrison, the Court drew a distinction between the regulation of
economic activity and the regulation of noneconomic activity. According to the Court, the
Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate only economic activity. Hence, in Lopez,
the Court struck down a federal statute that prohibited the possession of a gun in a school
or within 1000 feet of the grounds of a school. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. In Morrison,
the Court rejected a provision that made it a federal crime to commit a crime of violence
that was motivated by the victim's gender. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
74 See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012).
7 The Supreme Court has employed a principle of proportionality when defendants
challenge the severity of their sentences under the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. However, that principle has been helpful to defendants in recent
decades only when challenging death sentences or sentences of life in prison without
parole. See Nancy Gertner, On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 1585, 1588-89 (2012); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 692-95 (2005).
76 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 ("[I]t is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense."); JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.01, at 49 (5th ed. 2009)
('Proportionality' is an important and recurring concept in the criminal law.").
n See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From
"Why Punish?" to "How Much?", I CRIM. L.F. 259, 278-81 (1990)- (discussing
philosophical underpinnings of proportionality in criminal sanctions).
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different defendants receive different punishments for the same misconduct."8 As
is commonly said, the punishment should fit the crime. 7 9
Accordingly, basic considerations of justice would be well served if Congress
were limited by a meaningful principle of proportionality when it exercises its
Commerce Clause power to establish sentences for criminal misconduct.o Indeed,
principles of proportionality already guide interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's ban. on cruel and unusual punishment in criminal cases, as well as
the Due Process Clause's limits on damages in civil cases. The Supreme Court has
imposed requirements of proportionality when judging the acceptability of
sentences for felons8 ' and when judging the acceptability of punitive damage
awards against tortfeasors.82
As the examples of criminal sentences and punitive damage awards indicate,
proportionality requirements generally have been applied when the federal or a
state government exercises its power against the individual, and the question is
whether the exercise of power too greatly infringes on personal liberty. But it also
is important to employ proportionality review when the question is whether the
federal government's exercise of power compromises state government autonomy.
The framers of the Constitution wanted to protect people from excessive federal
power that might be exercised against them directly or that might be exercised
against them indirectly through federal regulation of state governments.83 A
sensible application of the proportionality principle suggests that Congress exceeds
its authority when it imposes more severe sentences than do states for misconduct
that is local in its nature and in its impact.
To be sure, defendants have challenged the disparities between state and
federal sentences in the past, and they have been unsuccessful. Courts thus far have
not found a constitutional barrier to stiffer federal penalties. 84 But NFIB's principle
78 See James A. McLaughlin, Case Note, Reducing Unjustified Sentencing
Disparity, 107 Yale L.J. 2345, 2345 (1998).
79 To be sure, the Supreme Court has not applied the principle of proportionality very
effectively. See Lee, supra note 75, at 681-82 (noting "conceptual confusion over the
meaning of proportionality" in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
80 Considerations of proportionality also apply to civil misconduct. For example, tort
liability is measured in terms of the degree of harm caused.
81 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012).
82 See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996). The Court has relied on
considerations of proportionality in other contexts as well. See, e.g., City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (requiring "congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted [under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment] to that end"); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause requires a "rough proportionality"
between the impact of a proposed private development and a requirement that the
developer dedicate some land for a public purpose).
See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 385-89.
.84 Some federal circuits permit trial court judges to deviate from federal sentencing
guidelines to avoid disparities in sentericing, but other circuits do not. See Ryan Scott
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of proportionality provides a new and potentially important rationale for
eliminating the disparities between federal and state sentences. As indicated,
principles of proportionality are fundamental to the law. In addition, the concerns
that animated the Court's analysis when Congress exercises its taxing and
spending powers also are relevant when Congress exercises its Commerce Clause
authority.
When the federal government metes out much harsher penalties than do the
states, the states lose control over a key part of their governmental authority-the
power to decide how severely people should be punished for their misconduct.
Indeed, that is one of the core powers of a state government.8 ' Legislators in
California may view marijuana for medical purposes differently than legislators in
Oklahoma. Similarly, legislators in Massachusetts may view capital punishment
differently than legislators in Georgia. The principles of federalism recognize that
states generally should be able to reflect local standards in crafting their criminal
statutes.
Of course, there are important principles of criminal law that cannot be
overridden by popular opinion. It is wrong to punish the innocent, to punish
conduct that merely offends without causing tangible harm, or to criminalize
unpopular thoughts rather than harmful actions. But as long as states legislate
within the bounds of those fundamental principles, they may implement their own
view of the conduct. that should be punished and the severity with which it should
be punished. 86
Reynolds, Equal Justice Under Law: "Post-Booker", Should Federal Judges be able to
Depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Remedy Disparity Between
Codefendants' Sentences?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 538, 552-57 (2009). And the protection
against disparities is quite limited. It only is invoked when one defendant receives a more
severe sentence than codefendants for the same crime(s). See id. at 552; Gertner, supra
note 75, at 1588. In addition, trial court judges never are required to deviate from federal
sentencing guidelines to avoid disparities. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 696 F.3d 695,
699-700 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that district court's decision to sentence below guideline
range because of sentencing disparity was not required under the Eighth Amendment).
Defendants can prevail, however, if they show that their higher sentences reflected
impermissible racial or other invidious bias prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. See
Beale, Many Faces, supra note 64, at 764.
85 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (observing that
suppression of violent crime "has always been the prime object of the States' police
power"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (observing that "States
historically have been sovereign" in the enforcement of criminal law).
86 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1-7 (1995); Kenneth W. Simons, The
Relevance of Community Values to Just Deserts: Criminal Law, Punishment Rationales,
and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 635, 639-41, 647-49 (2000). Thus, for example,
when rejecting a First Amendment right to disseminate obscene materials, the Supreme
Court held that the definition of obscenity should take into account "community
standards." Under the three-prong Miller test, the trier of fact must first determine "whether
'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
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When states lose control over their authority to determine the severity of
criminal sentences, then we have the same compromise of the two-government
system that worried the NFIB Court with the Medicaid expansion. The Court acted
to prevent one central government from controlling policy for health care coverage
of the poor. Yet we have one central government controlling policy for the
punishment of criminal conduct.
Indeed, the intrusion into state authority is greater when Congress calls the
shots on the prosecution of local crime than when Congress calls the shots on the
implementation of health care policy. States have struggled for decades to meet the
health care needs of their indigent residents, and no state could provide health care
coverage for its poor without federal support. In fact, no state foots more than half
of the costs of its Medicaid program.87 A major federal role is critical to ensure
that access to health care becomes universal. In contrast, much of federal criminal
law is superfluous to the prosecution of local crime. The federal government often
passes criminal laws even when the states are dealing with the problem in an
effective manner.
To protect state control over law enforcement, the Supreme Court should
extend its principle of proportionality to federal sentences for misconduct that
reflects local criminal activity. If it becomes a federal crime to rob or assault
someone, the potential penalty for the federal crime should not exceed the potential
penalty for the corresponding state crime. Congress should not be able to substitute
its judgment for that of state legislatures when local crime is at stake.
Further, a principle of proportionality for assessing the constitutionality of a
prison term under the Commerce Clause would nicely complement existing
doctrine for judging whether a prison term violates the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment. As the Court recently observed in Miller v.
Alabama,9 the "concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment."o
More specifically, the question is whether the sentence is proportionate in terms of
the type of offender and the nature of the offense. 91 Thus, for example, juveniles
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
24(1973).
87 See THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER
31 (2013), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7334-05.pdf.
88 See Beale, Many Faces, supra note 64, at 755-56 (observing that when a particular
crime attracts wide media attention, legislators may not be able to resist the temptation to
intervene); Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
825, 825 (2000) (cataloguing various instances of federal criminal law being passed in
response to highly publicized crimes). Federal intrusion compromises state authority in
other ways. For example, federal procedural rules may be less protective than state
procedural rules. Under federal law, it can be easier to receive approval for a search
warrant or a wiretap or to obtain a conviction on the basis of an accomplice's
uncorroborated testimony. See Beale, Many Faces, supra note 64, at 768-69.
" 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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should not be treated as harshly as adults, and petty thefts should not be treated as
harshly as murders. As indicated, proportionality review under NFIB also could
consider the nature of the offense and ensure that federal sentences are not greater
than state sentences for the same local crime.
To be sure, the Eighth Amendment requirement of proportionality is not a
very strict one, 9 2 and federal sentences are not cruel and unusual merely because
they exceed the length of state sentences. But there should be a stricter standard for
proportionality under the Commerce Clause than under the Eighth Amendment.
Eighth Amendment considerations identify sentences that are prohibited to both
state and federal governments. In other words, the Eighth Amendment applies to
sentences that are so severe that they are never permissible. Commerce Clause
analysis, on the other hand, would identify sentences that are permissible under
state law but impermissible under federal law. The concern here is not that the
sentences are too severe, but that the degree of severity should be determined at the
state level rather than by Congress.
CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court's analysis of the Medicaid expansion apparently
yielded an anticoercion principle specific to the spending power, there is good
reason to find a broader principle of proportionality that applies more generally to
the exercise of power by Congress. Not only does a principle of proportionality
help explain the spending power and taxing power sections of NFIB, it also
supplies an important limiting principle for the commerce power. A requirement of
proportionality for the Commerce Clause promotes a fundamental principle of
justice and provides an important response to the long-standing concern with the
federalization of local crime.
92 See, e.g., Gertner, supra note 75, at 1588-89.
9 Note that it would not be unusual to hold Congress to a higher standard than state
legislators when the Commerce Clause power is at stake. While states may punish crimes
of violence motivated by the victim's gender, the federal government may not. See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-17 (2000). Similarly, while states may require
individuals to purchase health care insurance, the federal government may not use its
commerce power to do so. Rather, as NFIB indicates, Congress must rely on its taxing
power to enact a mandate to purchase health care insurance. When Congress tries to use its
commerce power to intrude into matters of local concern, the Court prevents it from doing
so. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-66 (1995) (rejecting a ban on the
possession of guns near schools on the ground that K-12 education and community crime
are matters of local concern); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (rejecting a federal civil
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence because noneconomic, violent crime is a
matter of local concern).
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